Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019) , in which there are no inter-agent externalities. Unlike prior works on this problem, we study the public persuasion problem in the general setting with: (i) arbitrary state spaces; (ii) arbitrary action spaces; (iii) arbitrary sender's utility functions. We fully characterize the computational complexity of computing a bi-criteria approximation of an optimal public signaling scheme. In particular, we show, in a voting setting of independent interest, that solving this problem requires at least a quasi-polynomial number of steps even in settings with a binary action space, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis. In doing so, we prove that a relaxed version of the MAXIMUM FEASIBLE SUBSYSTEM OF LINEAR INEQUALITIES problem requires at least quasi-polynomial time to be solved. Finally, we close the gap by providing a quasi-polynomial time bi-criteria approximation algorithm for arbitrary public persuasion problems that, in specific settings, yields a QPTAS.
Introduction
Information structure design studies how to shape agents' beliefs in order to achieve a desired outcome. When information is incomplete, the information structure determines "who knows what" about the parameters determining payoff functions. There has been a recent surge of interest in the study of how an informed principal may influence agents' collective behavior toward a favorable outcome, via the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. The prescriptive problems arising in such setting are often termed persuasion or signaling. The study of these problems has been driven by their application in domains such as auctions and online advertisement (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018; Miltersen and Sheffet, 2012; Emek et al., 2014) , voting (Alonso and Câmara, 2016; Cheng et al., 2015) , traffic routing (Bhaskar et al., 2016; Vasserman et al., 2015) , recommendation systems (Mansour et al., 2016) , security , and product marketing (Babichenko and Barman, 2017; Candogan, 2019 ).
Persuasion is the task faced by an informed principal-the sender-, trying to influence the behavior of the selfinterested agent(s) in the game-the receiver(s). Such a sender faces the algorithmic problem of determining the optimal information structure to further her own objectives. This is typically modeled through the selection of a signaling scheme, which maps the sender's parameters observations to distributions over possible signals. A foundational model describing the persuasion problem is the Bayesian persuasion framework (BP) by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . Here, there is a sender and a single receiver. The parameters determining the payoff functions are collectively termed the state of nature, and model exogenous stochasticity in the environment. Their prior distribution is known to both the sender and the receiver, but the sender observes the realized state of the environment, originating a fundamental asymmetry in the information available to the two agents. The prior distribution and the sender's signaling scheme determine the receiver equilibrium behavior. The model assumes the sender's commitment, which is a natural assumption in many settings (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Dughmi, 2017) . One argument to that effect is that reputation and credibility may be a key factor for the long-term utility of the sender (Rayo and Segal, 2010) .
A number of previous works focus on the public signaling problem in the no inter-agent externalities framework by Arieli and Babichenko (2019) . Dughmi and Xu (2017) rule out the existence of a PTAS even when receivers have binary action spaces, and objectives are linear, unless P = NP. For this reason, most of the works focus on the computation of bi-criteria approximations in which the persuasion constraints can be violated by a small amount. Cheng et al. (2015) present a polynomial-time bi-criteria approximation algorithm for voting scenarios. Xu (2019) studies public persuasion with binary action spaces and proposes a PTAS with a bi-criteria guarantee for monotone submodular sender's utility functions. Moreover, Xu (2019) also provides, under a non-degenerate assumption, a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal signaling scheme when the number of states of nature is fixed.
Our Results and Techniques
The main result of the paper is providing a tight characterization of the complexity of computing bi-criteria approximations of optimal public signaling schemes in arbitrary persuasion problems with no inter-agent externalities. Previous works on the same model exploit specific structures of the sender's utility functions to provide polynomial-time algorithms. Our main result is negative, showing that restricting the space of possible sender's utility functions is a necessary condition to design polynomial-time bi-criteria approximation algorithms. More precisely, the following result shows that it is unlikely that there exists a bi-criteria polynomial-time approximation algorithm even in simple settings with binary action spaces.
Corollary 1. Assuming ETH, there exists a constant ǫ * such that, for any ǫ ≤ ǫ * , finding a signaling scheme that is ǫ-persuasive and α-approximate requires time nΩ (log n) for any multiplicative or additive factor α, even for binary action spaces.
The proof of this result requires an intermediate step that is of independent interest and of general applicability. Specifically, we focus on a slight variation of the MAXIMUM FEASIBLE SUBSYSTEM OF LINEAR INEQUALITIES problem (ǫ-MFS) (Cheng et al., 2015) , where, given a linear system A x ≥ 0, A ∈ [−1, 1] nrow×ncol , we look for the vector x ∈ ∆ ncol almost (i.e., except for an additive factor ǫ) satisfying the highest number of inequalities (Definition 3). This is a constrained version of the MAX FLS problem previously studied by Amaldi and Kann (1995) , and it is commonly used in scheduling (Daskalakis et al., 2014) , signaling, and mechanism design (Cheng et al., 2015) . Assuming ETH, we prove that solving ǫ-MFS requires at least a quasi-polynomial number of steps via a reduction from two-provers games (Aaronson et al., 2014; Deligkas et al., 2016) (Section 3.1).
Then, we focus on a simple public persuasion problem where receivers are voters, and they have a binary action space since they must choose one between two candidates. We prove an hardness result (Theorem 6) for this setting which directly implies Corollary 1. We show that the ǫ-MFS problem is deeply connected to the problem of computing "good" posteriors, as the choice of an optimal x in ǫ-MFS maps to the choice of an ǫ-persuasive posterior.
In order to design an approximation algorithm, we resort to the assumption of α-approximable utility functions for the sender, as previously defined by Xu (2019) . An α-approximable sender's utility function is such that it is possible to obtain in polynomial time a tie breaking for the receivers guaranteeing to the sender an α-approximation of the optimal objective value. The request of α-approximability is natural since otherwise even the problem of evaluating the sender's objective for a given posterior over the states of nature would not be tractable. When the sender's utility function is α-approximable, there is no hope for a better approximation than an α-approximate signaling scheme. The following result shows that it is possible to compute, in quasi-polynomial time, a bi-criteria approximation with a factor arbitrarily close to α, i.e., the best factor that can be guaranteed on the objective value, and an arbitrary small loss in persuasiveness.
Theorem 7. Assume f is α-approximate, there exists a poly n log(n/δ) ǫ 2 algorithm that outputs an α(1 − δ)approximate ǫ-persuasive public signaling scheme.
For 1-approximable functions, Theorem 7 yields a bi-criteria QPTAS. In the setting of Xu (2019) (i.e., binary action spaces and state-independent sender's utility function), our result automatically yields a QPTAS for any monotone sender's utility function. In order to prove the result, we show that any posterior can be represented as a convex combination of k-uniform posteriors with only a small loss in the objective value. By restricting our attention to the set of k-uniform posteriors, which has quasi-polynomial size, the problem can be solved via a linear program of quasi-polynomial size.
Preliminaries
This section describes the instantiation of the Bayesian persuasion framework which is the focus of this work (Section 2.1), public signaling problems (Section 2.2), the notion of bi-criteria approximation adopted (Section 2.3), and it presents an explanatory application to voting problems (Section 2.4). For a comprehensive overview of the Bayesian persuasion framework we refer the reader to Kamenica (2018); Bergemann and Morris (2019) and Dughmi (2017) . 1
Basic Model
Our model is a generalization of the fundamental special case introduced by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), i.e., multiagent persuasion with no inter-agent externalities. We adopt the perspective of a sender facing a finite set of receivers R := [n]. Each receiver r has a finite set of ̺ r actions A r := {a i } ̺ r i=1 . Each receiver's payoff depends only on her own action and on a (random) state of nature θ, drawn from a finite set Θ := {θ i } d i=1 of cardinality d. In particular, receiver r's utility is specified by the function u r : A r × Θ → [0, 1]. Each receiver's utility does not depend on other receivers' actions for the no inter-agent externalities assumption Arieli and Babichenko (2019) . We denote by u r θ (a r ) ∈ [0, 1] the utility observed by receiver r when the state of nature is θ and she plays a r . Let A := × r∈R A r . An action profile (i.e, a tuple specifying an action for each receiver) is denoted by a ∈ A. The sender's utility, when the state of nature is θ, is described via the function f θ : A → [0, 1]. We write f θ (a) to denote sender's payoff when receivers behave according to action profile a and the state of nature is θ. As customary in the BP literature, f θ is represented implicitly for each θ (see Equation 3 for an example).
As it is customary in Bayesian persuasion, we assume θ is drawn from a common prior distribution µ ∈ int(∆ Θ ), which is explicitly known to the sender and the receivers. Moreover, the sender can publicly commit to a policy φ (i.e., a signaling scheme, see Section 2.2) which maps states of nature to signals for the receivers. A generic signal for receiver r is denoted by s r . The interaction between the sender and the receivers goes as follows:
1. the sender commits to a publicly known signaling scheme φ; 2. the sender observes the realized state of nature θ ∼ µ; 3. the sender draws (s r )n r=1 ∼ φ θ and communicates to each receiver r the signal s r ; 4. each receiver r observes s r and rationally updates her prior beliefs over Θ according to the Bayes rule. Then, each receiver selects an action maximizing her expected reward.
Let a be the tuple of receivers' choices. Each receiver r observes payoff u r θ (a r ), and the sender observes payoff f θ (a).
Public Signaling Schemes
Each receiver r has a set S r of available signals. A signal profile is a tuple s = (s r )n r=1 ∈ S specifying a signal for each receiver, where S := × r∈R S r . A public signaling scheme is a function φ : Θ → S mapping states of nature to signal profiles, with the constraint that each receiver has to receive the same signal. With an overload of notation we write s ∈ S for the public signal received by all receivers. The probability with which the sender selects s after observing θ is denoted by φ θ (s). Thus, it holds s∈S φ θ (s) = 1 for each θ ∈ Θ. After observing s ∈ S, receiver r performs a Bayesian update and infers a posterior belief p ∈ ∆ Θ over the states of nature as follows: the realized state of nature is θ with probability p θ := µ θ φ θ (s)/ θ∈Θ µ θ φ θ (s). Since the prior is common and all receivers observe the same s, they all perform the same Bayesian update and have the same posterior belief regarding the states of nature. After forming p, each receiver solves a disjoint single-agent decision problem to find the action maximizing her expected utility.
A signaling scheme is direct when signals can be mapped to actions of the receivers, and interpreted as action recommendations. Each receiver is sent a vector specifying a (possibly different) action for each other receiver, i.e., for each r ∈ R, S r = A. Moreover, a signaling scheme is persuasive if following the recommendations is an equilibrium of the underlying Bayesian game (Bergemann and Morris, 2016a,b) . A direct signaling scheme is persuasive if the sender's action recommendation belongs to the set arg max a∈A r θ∈Θ p θ u r θ (a). A simple revelation-principle style argument shows that there always exists an optimal public signaling scheme which is both direct and persuasive (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Arieli and Babichenko, 2019) . A signal in a direct signaling scheme can be equivalently expressed as an action profile a ∈ A. Therefore, there is an exponential number of such signals. We write φ θ (a) to denote the probability with which the sender selects s = a when the realized state of nature is θ. The problem of determining an optimal public signaling scheme which is direct and persuasive can be formulated with the following (exponentially sized) linear program (LP):
The sender's goal is computing the signaling scheme maximizing her expected utility (objective function 1a). Constraints 1b force the public signaling scheme to be persuasive.
Bi-criteria Approximation
We say that a public signaling scheme is ǫ-persuasive if the following holds for any r ∈ R, a ∈ A, and a ′ ∈ A r :
Throughout the paper, we focus on the computation of approximately optimal signaling schemes. Let OPT be the optimal value of LP (1), i.e., the best sender's expected revenue under public persuasion constraints. Since f θ s are non-negative functions, we have that OPT ≥ 0. When a signaling scheme yields an expected sender utility of at least α OPT, with α ∈ (0, 1], we say that the signaling scheme is α-approximate. When a signaling scheme yields an expected sender utility of at least OPT − α, with α ∈ [0, 1), we say that the scheme is α-optimal.
Finally, we consider approximations which relax both the optimality and the persuasiveness constraints. When a signaling scheme is both ǫ-persuasive and α-approximate (or α-optimal), we say it is a bi-criteria approximation. We say that one such signaling scheme is (α, ǫ)-persuasive.
An Application: Persuasion In Voting Problems
In an election with a k-voting rule, candidates are elected if they receive at least k ∈ [n] votes. In this setting, a sender (e.g., a politician or a lobbyist) may send signals to the voters on the basis of private information which is hidden from them. After observing the sender's signal, each voter (i.e., the receivers) chooses one among the set of candidates.
In the following, we will employ instances of k-voting in which receivers have to choose one between two candidates. Then, they have a binary action space with actions a 0 and a 1 corresponding to the choice of the first and the second candidate, respectively. Each receiver r has utility u r θ (a) ∈ [0, 1] for each a ∈ {a 0 , a 1 }, θ ∈ Θ. The sender's preferred candidate is the one corresponding to action a 0 . Therefore, her objective is maximizing the probability that a 0 receives more than k votes. Formally, the sender's utility function is such that f θ = f for each θ, and
Moreover, let W : ∆ Θ → N + 0 be a function returning, for a given posterior distribution p ∈ ∆ Θ , the number of receivers such that
In the above setting, we refer to the problem of finding an ǫ-persuasive signaling scheme which is also α-approximate (or α-optimal) as (α, ǫ)-k-voting. To further clarify this election scenario, we provide the following simple example, by Castiglioni et al. (2019) . Example 1. There are three voters R = {1, 2, 3} who must select one between two candidates {a 0 , a 1 }. The sender (e.g., a politician or a lobbyist) observes the realized state of nature, drawn from the uniform distribution over Θ = {A, B, C}, and exploits this information to help a 0 being elected. The state of nature describes the position of a 0 on a matter of particular interest to the voters. Moreover, all the voters have a slightly negative opinion of candidate a 1 , independently of the state of nature. Table 1 describes the utility of the three voters. We consider a k-voting rule with k = 2. Without any form of signaling, all the voters would vote for a 1 because it provides an expected utility of −1/4, against −1/3. If the sender discloses all the information regarding the state of nature (i.e., with a fully informative signal), he would still get 0 utility, since two out of three receivers would pick a 1 in each of the possible states. However, the sender can design a public signaling scheme guaranteeing herself utility 1 for each state of nature. Table 2 describes one such scheme with arbitrary signals. Suppose the observed state is A, and that the signal is not B. Then, the posterior distribution over the states of nature is (1/2, 0, 1/2). Therefore, receiver 1 and receiver 3 would vote for a 0 since their expected utility would be 0 against −1/4. Similarly, for any other signal, two receivers vote for a 0 . Then, the sender's expected payoff is 1. We can recover an equivalent direct signaling scheme by sending a tuple with a candidates' suggestion for each voter. For example, not A would become (a 1 , a 0 , a 0 ), and each voter would observe the recommendations given to the others.
Technical Toolkit
In this section, we describe some key results previously studied in the literature that we will exploit in the remainder of the paper. In particular, we summarize some of the results on two-prover games by Babichenko et al. (2015) and Deligkas et al. (2016) (Section 3.1), and we describe a useful Theorem on error-correcting codes by Gilbert (1952) (Section 3.2).
Two-Provers Games
A two-prover game G is a co-operative game played by two players (Merlin 1 and Merlin 2 , resp.), and an adjudicator (verifier) called Arthur. At the beginning of the game, Arthur draws a pair of questions (x, y) ∈ X × Y according to a probability distribution D over the joint set of questions (i.e., D ∈ ∆ X ×Y ). Merlin 1 (resp., Merlin 2 ) observes x (resp., y) and chooses an answer ξ 1 (resp., ξ 2 ) from her finite set of answers Ξ 1 (resp., Ξ 2 ). Then, Arthur declares the Merlins to have won with a probability equal to the value of a verification function V(x, y, ξ 1 , ξ 2 ). A strategy for Merlin 1 is a function η 1 : X → Ξ 1 mapping each possible question to an answer. Analogously, η 2 : Y → Ξ 2 is a strategy of Merlin 2 . Before the beginning of the game, Merlin 1 and Merlin 2 can agree on their pair of (possibly mixed) strategies (η 1 , η 2 ), but no communication is allowed during the games. The payoff of a game G under (η 1 , η 2 ) is defined as: u(G, η 1 , η 2 ) := E (x,y)∼D [V(x, y, η 1 (x), η 2 (y))] . The value of a two-prover game G, denoted by ω(G), is the maximum expected payoff to the Merlins when they play optimally:
A two-prover game is called a free game if D is a uniform distribution over X × Y. This implies that there is no correlation between the questions sent to Merlin 1 and Merlin 2 . It is possible to build a family of free games mapping to 3SAT formula arising from Dinur's PCP theorem. We say that the size n of a formula ϕ is the number of variables plus the number of clauses in the formula. Moreover, SAT(ϕ)∈ [0, 1] is the maximum fraction of clauses that can be satisfied in ϕ. With this notation, the Dinur's PCP Theorem reads as follows: Theorem 1 (Dinur's PCP Theorem (Dinur, 2007) ). Given any 3SAT instance ϕ of size n, and a constant ρ ∈ (0, 1 8 ), we can produce in polynomial time a 3SAT instance ϕ ′ such that:
1. the size of ϕ ′ is n polylog(n);
each clause of ϕ ′ contains exactly 3 variables, and every variable is contained in at most
A 3SAT formula can be seen as a bipartite graph in which the left vertices are the variables, the right vertices are the clauses, and there is an edge between a variable and a clause whenever that variable appears in that clause. Then, a such bipartite graph has constant degree since each vertex has constant degree. This holds because each clause has at most 3 variables and each variable is contained in at most d clauses. A useful result on bipartite graphs is the following.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1 of Deligkas et al. (2016) ). Let (V, E) be a bipartite graph with |V | = n, and U and W be the two disjoints and independent sets such that V = U ∪ W , and where each vertex has degree at most d. Suppose that U and W both have a constant fraction of the vertices, i.e., |U | = cn and |W | = (1 − c)n for some c ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we can efficiently find a partition
of W , such that each set has size at most 2 √ n, and for all i and j we have
Lemma 1 can be used to build the following free game. Definition 1 (Definition 2 of Deligkas et al. (2016) ). Given a 3SAT formula ϕ of size n, we define a free game F ϕ as follows:
1. Arthur applies Theorem 1 to obtain formula ϕ ′ of size n polylog(n); 2. let m = n polylog(n). Arthur awards payoff 0 otherwise.
When computing Merlins' awards, the second condition is always satisfied when S i and T j share no variables. Moreover, when Merlin 1 's and Merlin 2 's assignments are not compatible, we say that they are in conflict.
The following lemma shows that, if ϕ is unsatisfiable, then the value of F ϕ is bounded away from 1. Lemma 2 (Lemma 2 by Deligkas et al. (2016) ). Given a 3SAT formula ϕ, the following holds:
We prove the following original result, which follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. Given a 3SAT formula ϕ, if ϕ is unsatisfiable, then for each (possibly randomized) Merlin 2 's strategy η 2 there exists a set S i such that each Merlin 1 's assignment to variables in S i is in conflict with Merlin 2 's assignment with probability at least ρ/2d.
Proof.
Let ω(F ϕ , η 2 |S i ) be the probability with which Arthur accepts Merlin's answers when Merlin 1 receives S i , and Merlin 2 follows strategy η 2 . Formally:
By definition of the value of a free game, we have:
Then, by Lemma 2, this results in:
which proves our statement.
We define FREEGAME δ as a particular problem within the class of promise problems (see, e.g., Even et al. (1984) ; Goldreich (2006)).
Definition 2 (FREEGAME δ ).
• INPUT: a free game F ϕ and a constant δ > 0.
• OUTPUT: YES-instances: ω(F ϕ ) = 1; NO-instances: ω(F ϕ ) ≤ 1 − δ.
Finally, the following lower bound will be exploited in the remainder of the paper. We will need to assume the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH), which conjectures that any deterministic algorithm solving 3SAT requires 2 Ω(n) time.
Theorem 2. (Theorem 2 by Deligkas et al. (2016) ) Assuming ETH, there exists a constant δ = ρ/2d such that FREEGAME δ requires time nΩ (logn) . 2
Error-Correcting Codes
A message of length k ∈ N + is encoded as a block of length n ∈ N + , with n ≥ k. A code is a mapping e : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n . Moreover, let dist(e(x), e(y)) be the relative Hamming distance between e(x) and e(y), which is defined as the Hamming distance weighted by 1/n. The rate of a code is defined as R = k n . Finally, the relative distance dist(e) of a code e is the maximum value d such that dist(e(x), e(y)) ≥ d for each x, y ∈ {0, 1} k .
In the following, we will need an infinite sequence of codes E := {e k : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n } k∈N+ containing one code e k for each possible message length k. The following result, due to Gilbert (1952) , can be used to construct an infinite sequence of codes with constant rate and distance.
Theorem 3 (Gilbert-Varshamov Bound) . For every k ∈ N + , 0 ≤ d < 1 2 and n ≥ k 1−H2(d) , there exists a code e : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n with dist(e) = d, where
Moreover, it can be computed in time 2 O(n) .
2Ω hides polylogarithmic factors.
Maximum ǫ-Feasible Subsystem of linear inequalities
Given a system of linear inequalities A x ≥ 0 with A ∈ [−1, 1] nrow×ncol and x ∈ ∆ ncol , we study the problem of finding the largest subsystem of linear inequalities that violates the constraints of at most ǫ. As we will show in Section 5, this problem presents some deep connections with the problem of determining good posteriors in signaling problems. Definition 3 (ǫ-MFS). Given a matrix A ∈ [−1, 1] nrow×ncol , let x * ∈ ∆ ncol be the probability vector maximizing
The problem of finding the maximum ǫ-feasible subsystem of linear inequalities (ǫ-MFS) amounts to finding a probability vector x ∈ ∆ ncol such that, by letting w = A x, it holds:
This problem is previously studied by Cheng et al. (2015) . They design a bi-criteria PTAS for the ǫ-MFS problem guaranteeing the satisfaction of at least k * − ǫ n row inequalities. Initially, we show that ǫ-MFS can be solved in n O(log n) steps. We introduce the following auxiliary definition.
Definition 4 (k-uniform distribution). A probability distribution x ∈ ∆ X is k-uniform if and only if it is the average of a multiset of k basis vectors in |X|-dimensional space.
Equivalently, each entry x i of a k-uniform distribution has to be a multiple of 1/k. Then, the following result holds.
Theorem 4. ǫ-MFS can be solved in n O(log n) steps.
Proof. Denote by x * the optimal solution of ǫ-MFS. Letx ∈ ∆ ncol be the empirical distribution of k i.i.d. samples drawn from probability distribution x * . Moreover, let w * := A x * andw := Ax. By Hoeffding's inequality we have
Then, by the union bound, we get Pr(∃i s.t. w * i −w i ≥ ǫ) ≤ n row e −2kǫ 2 . Finally, we can write Pr(w * i −w i ≤ ǫ ∀i ∈ [n row ]) ≥ 1 − n row e −2kǫ 2 . Thus, setting k = log n row /ǫ 2 ensures the existence of a vectorx guaranteeing that, if w * i ≥ 0, thenw i ≥ −ǫ. Sincex is k-uniform by construction, we can find it by enumerating over all the O((n col ) k ) k-uniform probability vectors where k = log n row /ǫ 2 . Trivially, this task can be performed in n log nrow/ǫ 2 steps and, therefore, in n O(log n) steps.
We show that ǫ-MFS requires at least nΩ (log n) steps, thus closing the gap with the upper bound stated by Theorem 4 except for polylogarithmic factors of log n in the denominator of the exponent.
Theorem 5. Assuming ETH, there exists a constant ǫ > 0 such that solving ǫ-MFS requires time nΩ (log n) .
Proof. OVERVIEW. We provide a polynomial-time reduction from FREEGAME δ (Def. 1) to ǫ-MFS, where ǫ = δ 26 = ρ 52d (see Section 3.1 for the definition of parameters δ, ρ, d). We show that, given a free game F ϕ instance, it is possible to build a matrix A s.t., for a certain value k * , the following holds: (i) if ω(F ϕ ) = 1, then there exists a vector x s.t.
i∈[nrow]
CONSTRUCTION. In the free game F ϕ , Arthur sends a set of variables S i to Merlin 1 and a set of clauses T j to Merlin 2 , where i, j ∈ [m], m = n polylog(n). Then, Merlin 1 's (resp., Merlin 2 's) answer is denoted by ξ 1 ∈ Ξ 1 (resp., ξ 2 ∈ Ξ 2 ). The system of linear inequalities used in the reduction has a vector of variables x structured as follows.
1. Variables corresponding to Merlin 2 's answers. There is a variable x Tj ,ξ2 for each j ∈ [m] and, due to Lemma 1 and the assumption |T j | = 2m, it holds ξ 2 ∈ Ξ 2 = {0, 1} 6m (if |T j | < 2m, we extend ξ 2 with extra bits).
Variables corresponding to
Merlin 1 's answers. We need to introduce some further machinery to augment the dimensionality of Ξ 1 via a viable mapping. Let e : {0, 1} 2m → {0, 1} 8m be the code stated in Theorem 3 with rate 1/4 and relative distance dist(e) ≥ 1/5. We can safely assume that
we extend ξ 1 with extra bits). Then, e(ξ 1 ) is the 8m-dimensional encoding of answer ξ 1 via code e. Let e(ξ 1 ) j be the j-th bit of vector e(ξ 1 ). We have a variable x i,ℓ for each index i ∈ [8m] and ℓ := {ℓ j } j∈[m] ∈ {0, 1} m . These variables can be interpreted as follows. Suppose to have an answer encoding for each of the possible set S j . There are m such encodings, each of them having 8m bits. Then, it holds x i,ℓ > 0 if the i-th bit of the encoding corresponding to S j is ℓ j .
There is a total of m 2 m (2 5m + 8) variables. Matrix A has a number of columns equal to the number of variables. We denote with A ·,(Tj,ξ2) the column with the same index of variable x Tj ,ξ2 . Analogously, A ·,(i,ℓ) is the column corresponding to variable x i,ℓ . Rows are grouped in four types, denoted by {t i } 4 i=1 . We write A ti,· when referring to an entry of any row of type t i . Further arguments may be added as a subscript to identify specific entries of A. Rows are structured as follows.
1. Rows of type t 1 : there are q (the value of q is specified later in the proof) rows of type t 1 s.t. A t1,(Tj ,ξ2) = 1 for each j ∈ [m], ξ 2 ∈ Ξ 2 , and A t1,· = −1 otherwise.
2. Rows of type t 2 : there are q rows for each subset T ⊆ {T j } j∈ [m] with cardinality m/2 (i.e., there is a total of q m m/2 rows of type t 2 ). Then, the following holds for each T :
3. Rows of type t 3 : there are q rows of type t 3 for each subset of 4m indices I drawn from [8m], for a total of q 8m 4m t 3 rows. For each subset of indices I we have:
4. Rows of type t 4 : there is a row of type t 4 for each S i and ξ 1 . Each of these rows is s.t.:
Finally, we set k * = 1 + m m/2 + 8m 4m q + m and q ≫ m (e.g., q = 2 10m ). We say that row i satisfies ǫ-MFS condition for a certain x if w i ≥ −ǫ, where w = A x (in the following, we will also consider w i ≥ 0 as an alternative condition). We require at least k * rows to satisfy the ǫ-MFS condition. Then, all rows of types t 1 , t 2 , t 3 and at least m rows of type t 4 must be s.t. w i satisfies the condition. COMPLETENESS. Given a satisfiable assignment of variables ζ to ϕ, we build vector x as follows. Let ζ Tj be the partial assignment obtained by restricting ζ to the variables in the clauses of T j (if |T j | < 2m we pad ζ Tj with bits 0 until ζ Tj has length 6m). Then, we set x Tj ,ζT j = 1/2m. Moreover, for each i ∈ [8m] and ℓ i = (e(ζ S1 ) i , . . . , e(ζ Sm ) i ), we set x i,ℓ i = 1/16m. We show that x is s.t. there are at least k * rows i with w i ≥ 0 (Condition (4)). First, each row i of type t 1 is s.t. w i = 0 since Tj ,ξ2 x Tj ,ξ2 = i,ℓ x i,ℓ = 1/2. For each T j , ξ2 x Tj ,ξ2 = 1/2m. Then, for each subset T of {T j } j∈[m] , we have ξ2,Tj ∈T x Tj ,ξ2 = 1/4. This implies that each row i of type t 2 is s.t. w i = 0. A similar argument holds for rows of type t 3 . Finally, we show that for each S i there is at least a row i of type t 4 s.t. w i ≥ 0. Take the row corresponding to
Then, there are 8m columns played with probability 1/16m with value 1/2, i.e., b,ℓ A (t4,Si,ζS i ), (b,ℓ) x b,ℓ = 1/4. Moreover, for each (T j , ζ Tj ), it holds V(S i , T j , ζ Si , ζ Tj ) = 1. Then, Tj ,ξ2 A (t4,Si,ζS i ),(Tj ,ζT j ) x Tj ,ξ2 = −1/4. This concludes the completeness section.
SOUNDNESS. We show that
with w = A x. Assume, by contradiction, that one such vector x exists. For the sake of clarity, we summarize the structure of the proof. (i) We show that the probability assigned by x to columns of type (T j , ξ 2 ) has to be close to 1/2, and the same has to hold for columns of type (i, ℓ). (ii) We show that x has to distribute probability almost uniformly among T j s and indices i (resp., Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 below). Intuitively, this resembles the fact that, in F ϕ , Arthur draws questions T j according to a uniform probability distribution. (iii) For each S i , there is at most one row (t 4 , S i , ξ 1 ) s.t. w (t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ (Lemma 7). This implies, together with the hypothesis, that there exists exactly one such row for each S i . (iv) Finally, we show that the above construction leads to a contradiction with Lemma 3 for a suitable free game.
Before providing the details of the four above steps, we introduce the following result, due to Babichenko et al. (2015) .
Lemma 4 (Essentially Lemma 2 of Babichenko et al. (2015) ). Let v ∈ ∆ n be a probability vector, and u be the n-dimensional uniform probability vector. If ||v − u|| > c, then there exists a subset of indices I ⊆ [n] such that |I| = n/2 and i∈I v i > 1 2 + c 4 .
Then, (i) Equation 6 requires all rows i of type t 1 , t 2 , t 3 to be s.t. w i ≥ −ǫ. This implies that, for rows of type t 1 , it holds Tj ,ξ2 x Tj ,ξ2 ≥ 1/2(1 − ǫ). Indeed, if, by contradiction, this inequality does not hold, each row i of type t 1 would be s.t. w i < 1/2−ǫ/2−(1/2+ǫ/2) = −ǫ, thus violating Equation 6. Moreover, Equation 6 implies that at least a row (t 4 , S i , ξ 1 ) has w (t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ. Therefore, it holds i,ℓ x i,ℓ ≥ 1/2 − ǫ. Indeed, if, by contradiction, this condition did not hold, all rows of type t 4 would have w i < 1/2(1/2 − ǫ) − 1/2(1/2 + ǫ) = −ǫ.
(ii) Let v 1 ∈ ∆ m be the probability vector defined as v 1,j := ξ 2
x T j ,ξ 2 j,ξ 2
x T j ,ξ 2 , andṽ be a generic uniform probability vector of suitable dimension. The following result shows that the element-wise difference between v 1 andṽ has to be bounded if Equation 6 has to be satisfied.
Lemma 5. If ||v 1 −ṽ|| 1 > 16ǫ, there exists a row i of type t 2 such that w i < −ǫ.
Let v 2 ∈ ∆ [8m] be the probability vector defined as v 2,i := ℓ x i,ℓ i,ℓ x i,ℓ , andṽ be a suitable uniform probability vector. The following holds. Lemma 6. If ||v 2 −ṽ|| 1 > 16ǫ, there exists a row i of type t 3 such that w i < −ǫ.
Proof. Lemma 4 implies that, if ||v 2 −ṽ|| 1 > 16ǫ, there exists a set I ⊆ [8m] such that i∈I ℓ x i,ℓ > (1/2 + 4ǫ) i,ℓ x i,ℓ > 1/4 + ǫ. Then, i / ∈I ℓ x i,ℓ < 1/2 + ǫ/2 − 1/4 − ǫ = 1/4 − ǫ/2. It follows that there exists a row (t 3 , I) such that w t3,I < −1/4 − ǫ + 1/4 − ǫ/2 < −ǫ.
In order to satisfy Equation 6, all rows i of type t 2 and t 3 have to be s.t. w i ≥ −ǫ. Then, by Lemmas 5 and 6, it has to hold that ||v 1 −ṽ|| 1 ≤ 16ǫ and ||v 2 −ṽ|| 1 ≤ 16ǫ.
(iii) We show that, for each S i , there exists at most one row (t 4 , S i , ξ 1 ) for which w (t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ.
Proof. Let f(x, ξ 1 ) := j:ℓi=e(ξ1)j x j,ℓ . Assume, by contradiction, that for a given S i there exist two assignments ξ ′ 1 and ξ ′′ 1 such that w (t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ for each ξ 1 ∈ {ξ ′ 1 , ξ ′′ 1 }. Then, f(x, ξ 1 ) ≥ 1/2 − ǫ, for each ξ 1 ∈ {ξ ′ 1 , ξ ′′ 1 }. Otherwise we would get w (t4,Si,ξ1) < 1/2(1/2 − ǫ) − 1/2(1/2 + ǫ) = −ǫ for at least one
By Lemma 4 and 6, we have that ||v 2 −ṽ|| 1 ≤ 16ǫ. Therefore, we can obtain a uniform vectorx by moving at most 16ǫ probability from x ′ . This results in a decrease of f of at most 16ǫ, that is f(x, ξ 1 ) ≥ 1 − 20ǫ for each ξ 1 ∈ {ξ ′ 1 , ξ ′′ 1 }. By construction dist(e) = 1/5, which implies dist(e(ξ ′ 1 ), e(ξ ′′ 1 )) ≥ 1/5. Then, there exists a set of indices I, with |I| ≥ 8m/5, such that e(ξ ′ 1 ) j = e(ξ ′′ 1 ) j for each j ∈ I. Therefore, f(x, ξ ′ 1 ) + f(x, ξ ′′ 1 ) ≤ j∈I 1/8m + j / ∈I 2/8m ≤ 2 − 1/5. This leads to a contradiction with f(x,
Then, there are at least m rows (t 4 , S i , ξ 1 ) s.t. w (t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ and, by Lemma 7, we get that there exists exactly one such row for each S i , i ∈ [m]. Therefore, for each S i , there exists ξ i 1 ∈ Ξ 1 s.t. (Tj , ξ2) :V(Si,Tj ,ξ i 1 ,ξ2)=1 x (Tj ,ξ2) ≥ 1/2 − 4ǫ. If this condition did not hold, by Step (i), we would obtain w t4,Si,ξ i 1 < −1/2(1/2 − 4ǫ) − 7/2ǫ + 1/2(1/2 + ǫ/2) = −ǫ. (iv) Finally, let F * ϕ be a free game in which Arthur (i.e., the verifier) chooses question T j with probability v 1,j as defined in Step (ii), and Merlin 2 (i.e., the second prover) answers ξ 2 with probability x Tj ,ξ2 /v 1,j . In this setting (i.e., F * ϕ ), given question S i to Merlin 1 , the two provers will provide compatible answers with probability
where the first inequality holds for the condition at Step (i). In a canonical (i.e., as in Definition 1) free game F ϕ , Arthur picks questions according to a uniform probability distribution. The main difference between F ϕ and F * ϕ is that, in the latter, Arthur draws questions for Merlin 2 from v 1 . However, we know that differences between v 1 and a uniform probability vector must be limited. Specifically, by Lemma 5, we have ||v 1 −ṽ|| 1 ≤ 16ǫ. Then, if Merlin 1 and Merlin 2 applied in F ϕ the strategies we described for F * ϕ , their answers would be compatible with probability at least P(V(S i , T j , ξ i 1 , ξ 2 ) = 1 | S i ) ≥ 1 − 26ǫ, for each S i . Finally, by picking ǫ = ρ/52d, we reach a contradiction with Lemma 3. This concludes the proof.
The Hardness of (α, ǫ)-persuasion
We show that a public signaling scheme approximating the value of the optimal one cannot be computed in polynomial time even if we allow it to be ǫ-persuasive (see Equation 2). Specifically, computing an (α, ǫ)-persuasive signaling scheme requires at least nΩ (log n) , where the dimension of the instance is n = O(n d). We prove this result for the specific case of the k-voting problem, as introduced in Section 2.4. Besides its practical applicability, this problem is particularly instructive in highlighting the strong connection between the problem of finding suitable posteriors and the ǫ-MFS problem, as discussed in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Given a k-voting instance, the problem of finding a posterior p ∈ ∆ Θ such that W ǫ (p) ≥ 0 is equivalent to finding an ǫ-feasible subsystem of k linear inequalities over the simplex when A ∈ [−1, 1]n ×d is such that:
Proof. By setting x = p, it directly follows that i∈ [n] 
The above lemma shows that deciding if there exists a posterior p such that W (p) ≥ k or if all the posteriors have W ǫ (p) < k (i.e., deciding if the utility of the sender can be greater than zero) is as hard as solving ǫ-MFS. More precisely, if the ǫ-MFS instance does not admit any solution, then there does not exist a posterior guaranteeing the sender strictly positive winning probability. On the other hand, if the ǫ-MFS instance admits a solution, there exists a signaling scheme where at least one of the induced posteriors guarantees the sender wining probability > 0. However, the above connection between the ǫ-MFS problem and the k-voting problem is not sufficient to prove the inapproximability of the k-voting problem, as the probability whereby this posterior is reached may be arbitrarily small.
Luckily enough, the next theorem shows that it is possible to strengthen the inapproximability result by constructing an instance in which, when 3SAT is satisfiable, there is a signaling scheme such that all the induced posteriors satisfy W (p) ≥ k (i.e., the sender wins with probability 1).
Theorem 6. Given a k-voting instance and assuming ETH, there exists a constant ǫ * such that, for any ǫ ≤ ǫ * , finding an (α, ǫ)-persuasive signaling scheme requires nΩ (log n) steps for any multiplicative or additive factor α.
Proof. OVERVIEW. By following the proof of Theorem 4, we provide a polynomial-time reduction from FREEGAME δ to the problem of finding an ǫ-persuasive signaling scheme in k-voting, with ǫ = δ/780 = ρ/1560d. Specifically, if ω(F ϕ ) = 1, there exists a signaling scheme guaranteeing the sender an expected value of 1. Otherwise, if ω(F ϕ ) ≤ 1 − δ, then all posteriors are such that W ǫ (p) < k (i.e., the sender cannot obtain more than 0).
CONSTRUCTION. The k-voting instance has the following possible states of nature. The shared prior µ is such that: µ θ (T j ,ξ 2 ) = 1 m2 2+6m for each θ (Tj ,ξ2) , µ θ (i,ℓ) = 1 m2 5+m for each θ (i,ℓ) , and µ θ d = 1 2 1+7m
for each θ d . To simplify the notation, in the remaining of the proof let u r θ := u r θ (a 0 ) − u r θ (a 1 ). The k-voting instance comprises the following receivers.
1. Receivers of type t 1 : there are q (the value of q is specified later in the proof) receivers of type t 1 , which are such that u t1 θ (T j ,ξ 2 ) = 1 for each (T j , ξ 2 ), and −1/3 otherwise.
2. Receivers of type t 2 : there are q receivers of type t 2 such that u t2 θ (i,ℓ) = 1 for each (i, ℓ), and −1/3 otherwise.
3. Receivers of type t 3 : there are q receivers of type t 3 for each subset T ⊆ {T j } j∈[m] of cardinality m/2. Each receiver corresponding to the subset T is such that: 
5.
Receivers of type t 5 : there is a receiver of type t 5 for each S i , ξ 1 ∈ Ξ 1 and d ∈ {0, 1} 7m . Let ⊕ be the XOR operator. Then, for each receiver of type t 5 the following holds:
Finally, we set k = 2 + m m/2 + 8m 4m q + m. By setting q ≫ m (e.g., q = 2 10m ), candidate a 0 can get at least k votes only if all receivers of type t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 vote for her. COMPLETENESS. Given a satisfiable assignment ζ to the variables in ϕ, let [ζ] Tj ∈ {0, 1} 6m be the vector specifying the variables assignment of each clause in T j , and [ζ] Si ∈ {0, 1} 2 m be the vector specifying the assignment of each variable belonging to S i . The sender has a signal for each d ∈ {0, 1} 7m . The set of signals is denoted by S, where |S| = 2 7m , and a signal is denoted by s d ∈ S. We define a signaling scheme φ as follows. First, we set
we prove that the signaling scheme is consistent. For each state θ (Tj , ξ2) , it holds that
and, for each θ (i,ℓ) , the following holds:
Now, we show that there exist at least k voters that will choose a 0 . Let p ∈ ∆ Θ be the posterior induced by a signal s d . All receivers of type t 1 choose a 0 since it holds:
A quasi-polynomial time algorithm for (α, ǫ)-persuasion
In this section, we prove that our hardness result (Theorem 6) is tight by devising a bi-criteria approximation algorithm. Our result extends the results by Cheng et al. (2015) and Xu (2019) for signaling problems with binary action spaces. Indeed, it encompasses scenarios with an arbitrary number of actions and state-dependent sender's utility functions.
In order to prove our result, we need some further machinery. Let Z r := 2 A r be the power set of A r . Then, Z := × r∈R Z r is the set of tuples specifying a subset of A r for each receiver r. For a given probability distribution over the states of nature, we are interested in determining the set of best responses of each receiver r, i.e., the subset of A r maximizing her expected utility. Formally, we have the following. Definition 5 (BR-set). Given p ∈ ∆ Θ , the best-response set (BR-set) M p := (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) ∈ Z is such that Z r = arg max a∈A r θ∈Θ p θ u r θ (a) for each r ∈ R.
Similarly, we define a notion of ǫ-BR-set which comprises ǫ-approximate best responses to a given distribution over the states of nature. Definition 6 (ǫ-BR-set). Given p ∈ ∆ Θ , the ǫ-best-response set (ǫ-BR-set) M p,ǫ := (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) ∈ Z is such that, for each r ∈ R, action a belongs to Z r if and only if θ∈Θ p θ u r θ (a) ≥ θ∈Θ p θ u r θ (a ′ ) − ǫ for each a ′ ∈ A r .
We introduce a suitable notion of approximability of the sender's objective function. Our notion of α-approximable function is a generalization of Xu (2019, Definition 4.5) to the setting of arbitrary action spaces and state-dependent sender's utility functions. Definition 7 (α-Approximability). Let f := {f θ } θ∈Θ be a set of functions f θ : A → [0, 1]. We say that f is αapproximable if there exists a function g : ∆ Θ × Z → A computable in polynomial time such that, for all p ∈ ∆ Θ and Z ∈ Z, it holds: a = g(µ, Z), a ∈ Z and θ∈Θ p θ f θ (a) ≥ α max a * ∈Z θ∈Θ p θ f θ (a * ).
The α-approximability assumption is natural since otherwise it would be intractable even to evaluate the sender's objective value. When f is α-approximable, it is possible to find an approximation of the optimal receivers' tie breaking when they are constrained to select actions profiles in Z.
We now provide an algorithm which computes in quasi-polynomial time, for any α-approximable f , a bi-criteria approximation of the optimal solution with an approximation on the objective value arbitrarily close to α. When f is 1-approximate our result yields a bi-criteria QPTAS for the problem. The key idea is showing that an optimal signaling scheme can be approximated by a convex combination of suitable k-uniform posteriors. Let ̺ := max r∈R ̺ r ,n := |R|, and d := |Θ|.
Proof. We show that there exists a poly d log(n̺/δ) ǫ 2 algorithm that computes the given approximation. Let k = 32 log(4n̺/δ) ǫ 2 and K ⊂ ∆ Θ be the set of k-uniform distributions over Θ (Def. 4). We prove that all posteriors p * ∈ ∆ Θ can be decomposed as a convex combination of k-uniform posteriors without lowering too much the sender's expected utility. Formally, each posterior p * ∈ ∆ Θ can be written as p * = p∈K γ p p, with γ ∈ ∆ K such that p∈K γ p θ∈Θ p θ f θ (g(p, M ǫ (p))) ≥ α(1 − ǫ) max a * ∈M(p * ) θ∈Θ p * θ f θ (a * ).
Letγ ∈ K be the empirical distribution of k i.i.d. samples from p * , where each θ has probability p * θ of being sampled. Therefore, the vectorγ is a random variable supported on k-uniform posteriors with expectation p * . Moreover, let γ ∈ ∆ K be a probability distribution such as, for each p ∈ K, γ p := Pr(γ = p). For a each γ ∈ ∆ K and p ∈ K, we define by γ 
